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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to study the cost efficiency of multimunicipal systems 
operating at the bulk level in the Portuguese water sector. We will use Pooled OLS, Fixed 
Effects and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) to study the role of structural variables such as 
water losses, network density, water sources, quality measures, rainfall and topography in 
explaining the cost differences among those systems. Moreover, using SFA we determine 
operators’ efficiency scores. We found that inefficiency of operators remained constant over 
time. The main source of the distance to the cost frontier is a high degree of inefficiency and 
not exogenous random shocks. 
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1- Introduction.  
The water sector is often characterized as being capital-intensive, with long investment payback 
periods, configuring a typical case of a network industry. The management of water industry 
infrastructures, such as pumping stations, treatment plants, reservoirs and pipes, amounts to an 
indivisible water network, thus creating natural monopoly conditions. The requirement of high 
sunk costs tends to corroborate this aspect. These characteristics imply that production by a 
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single firm minimizes total costs. In addition, water operators usually develop their activities 
under regional exclusivity. In other words, they can be both legal and natural monopolies. A 
monopolistic market structure potentially entails three types of inefficiency: allocative, technical 
and dynamic. Firstly, a monopolist is bound to produce less and charge a higher price for its 
output when compared to the competitive case, implying allocative inefficiency: some units are 
not produced for which consumers would be willing to pay more than the social marginal cost 
of production. Moreover, a monopolist is technically inefficient when it does not necessarily 
produce the maximum possible output using the minimum quantity of inputs. Additionally, 
sectors characterized by a lack of competitive pressure tend to present lower rates of innovation, 
implying potential dynamic inefficiencies.  
The absence of a competitive environment in the water sector brings about the need for fair 
prices and the reduction of losses in social well-being. Therefore, under a normative view, there 
appears to be public interest justifications for regulatory intervention. In this context, 
benchmarking becomes very relevant since it helps regulatory authorities to define the 
appropriate policy instruments for the sector, while inducing the so called “good behavior” and 
potentially enhancing operators’ productivity.
1
 Moreover, the improvement in econometric 
methods throughout time and the increasing availability of data (i.e. the existence of longer 
panels) favored the discussion and the growing interest about efficiency analysis. 
The aim of this paper is to study the cost efficiency of multimunicipal systems operating at the 
bulk level in the Portuguese water sector. These systems were created with the purpose of 
operating bulk activities. The vast majority of studies only considers operators that supply water 
or provide wastewater services to final users (retail market), excluding operators which act as 
wholesalers (bulk level).  
                                                          
1 In broad terms, “good behavior” can be interpreted as incentives alignment between the regulatory authority and the regulated 
firms. 
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We will use Pooled OLS (POLS), Fixed Effects (FE) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) to 
study the role of structural variables such as water losses, network density, water sources, 
quality measures, rainfall and topography in explaining the cost differences among those 
systems. Moreover, using stochastic frontier models for panel data we determine operators’ 
technical efficiency scores.    
The importance of this type of papers relies on the encouragement of more efficient 
performances. Nevertheless, the existing data constraints and the difficulties in ensuring data 
comparability implicitly require that the conclusions here presented should be interpreted with 
some prudence and should never be read in an isolated manner. We must emphasize that the 
choice of the econometric strategy, the selection of specific variables and the inherent quality of 
data can potentially be reflected in substantially different empirical results.  
The remainder of the text is structured into sections. In Section 2, an overview of the 
Portuguese water sector is provided. In Section 3, we review some literature regarding cost 
efficiency in the water sector. In Section 4, we describe the data and the underlying 
methodology. In Section 5, the empirical results are presented and discussed. Finally, Section 6 
concludes the paper.  
2- The Portuguese water sector: an overview.  
Throughout this text, whenever water sector is mentioned, it is our purpose to encompass two 
distinct but complementary services within the scope of sanitation: the drinking water supply 
service (AA) and the wastewater management service (WW). Unlike what happens in most EU 
members, the Portuguese water sector is not vertically integrated – it is characterized by a bulk-
retail dichotomy in the supply chain.  
Regarding drinking water supply, the first stage of the supply chain consists in water 
abstraction. In this stage, operators start by pumping water out of a river or groundwater aquifer. 
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In order to overcome geomorphological barriers, water circulates under pressure in pipes to a 
given treatment plant. This stage is known as water elevation. In treatment plants, the water 
characteristics are corrected in such a way that it becomes safe for human consumption. 
Subsequently, treated water is transported from the zone of production (upstream) to the zone of 
consumption (downstream), where it is stored to ensure continuity of supply. Since the industry 
is not vertically integrated, it is then responsibility of the retailers to ensure the water distribution 
to final consumers. A complementary activity is the management of wastewater. The first stage 
consists in wastewater collection, which is done by retailers. Following the drainage and 
elevation, the treatment of wastewater is done by those operating at the bulk level. Moving up in 
the supply chain, another stage is sludge processing. After this stage, the solid content is 
transported to an adequate final destination, such as agricultural use or to a landfill, while the 
liquid content is discharged in the water environment.  
In the beginning of the 1990s, it was then considered that Portugal presented very poor 
indicators regarding population coverage of drinking water supply and basic sanitation: 80% 
and 60% of coverage, respectively. Almost 20 years later, a significant improvement was 
registered. According to the most recent statistics, in 2009, 96% of the Portuguese population 
was served by drinking water supply and 84% already had access to basic sanitation.
2
 
Undeniably, 1993 represents a crucial year in explaining the significant changes that took place 
in the Portuguese water sector. From 1977 to 1993, the Law of Sectors’ Delimitation (Law no. 
46/77, July 8) clearly defined which sectors of the economy were not allowed to belong to the 
private initiative. The water sector was one of them. In 1993, it became possible to open the 
sector to private investors. Until then, it was responsibility of the Portuguese municipalities to 
ensure the reasonable operation of local water supply and wastewater management services. 
                                                          
2 Source: http://www.pordata.pt (last access on March 31, 2013).  
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The only exception was EPAL in the municipality of Lisbon.
3
 Following the structural changes 
in the sector, Águas de Portugal was created in 1993, to speed up the development of 
multimunicipal systems, aimed at correcting the considerable heterogeneity and local 
fragmentation that characterized the Portuguese water sector. In addition, multimunicipal 
systems were created to ensure stable and safe drinking water quality, and to enlarge the access 
to basic sanitation. The Decree-Law no. 379/93 (November 5) then established the division 
between bulk and retail activities. Finally, it must also be recognized that since Portugal joined 
the European Economic Community (EEC), in 1986, the access to European funds allowed 
significant investments in network infrastructures.
4
   
Since 1997, Portugal has its own national regulation authority for the water sector (Decree-Law 
no. 230/97, August 30). ERSAR (formerly IRAR – Institute for the Regulation of Water and 
Solid Waste) is the Portuguese water and waste services regulation authority, and also the 
national authority for drinking water quality control. Initially, its jurisdiction in terms of 
economic regulation was limited to concessions and to a “soft” regulatory approach known as 
“sunshine regulation” – comparison of performance indicators applied to each operator, 
followed by their public display. This form of regulation is not coercive and rests on engaging 
operators in a virtual form of competition: operators are expected to react to that public display 
of information in such a way they try to improve and achieve a better place in the next year’s 
ranking. Given these limitations, an effort was made so that its powers and scope of action have 
                                                          
3 The Decree-Law no. 553-A/74 (October 30) created EPAL – Empresa Pública das Águas de Lisboa in substitution of CAL – 
Companhia das Águas de Lisboa, which was the concessionaire of water supply services to the city of Lisbon between 1868 
and 1974. In 1991, it was transformed in a public limited company (Decree-Law no. 230/91, April 21), and renamed to EPAL – 
Empresa Portuguesa das Águas Livres, SA. 
4 For example, between 1986 and 1988, Portugal received from the European Commission the equivalent to 1185 millions of 
Euros in structural funds: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF) and the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). Part of the ERDF was applied in the improvement of water 
supply and sanitation conditions. Source: http://www.ifdr.pt/content.aspx?menuid=25 (last access on March 31, 2013). 
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been enlarged in the last years. At the time of writing, ERSAR is rethinking its regulatory model 
and new legislation is under discussion in order to ensure an independent regulation.    
3- Literature review.  
The existing empirical literature on the water sector comprises the following topics: 1) the 
debate between public and private ownership; 2) the findings related to economies of scale, 
economies of output density and economies of scope; 3) the estimation of cost frontiers and 
efficiency scores; 4) the role of structural variables (e.g. population density, water sources and 
elevation differences) and the introduction of quality indicators, such as water losses and 
chemical treatment. In the next lines, a comprehensive literature survey is provided. 
Regarding the debate between public and private ownership, the main conclusion to derive from 
the literature is the existence of very modest empirical justifications for a general conjecture in 
favor of each type of ownership. When looking for evidence regarding the merits of public 
versus private ownership in Portugal, again no clear picture emerges. On the one hand, Martins, 
Fortunato and Coelho (2005) found that private ownership is statistically significant and 
positively related to total costs. On the other hand, Correia (2008) concluded that private 
ownership is statistically significant but negatively related to total costs. Although both authors 
use similar data sources, they use different econometric approaches.
5
 Moreover, the residuality 
of private ownership may also explain such opposite conclusions. In light of Walter et al. 
(2009), the conclusion is that the merits of ownership should not be studied alone, because the 
institutional context and the regulatory model also play an important role. In this paper, since the 
Portuguese State is the majority shareholder in multimunicipal systems, the question of 
ownership will not be our main interest. 
                                                          
5 Martins, Fortunato and Coelho (2005) use a cubic cost function application, while Correia (2008) prefers to follow SFA and 
considers a translogarithmic cost function.   
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Researchers have been demonstrating a growing interest about efficiency analysis in the water 
sector. Therefore, it is not difficult to find several studies for the majority of developed 
countries. Fraquelli and Moiso (2005) studied the cost efficiency and economies of scale in the 
Italian water sector using a stochastic frontier approach. They found that vertical integration 
seems to generate economies of scale, implying that the optimum size of operators should be 
revised. Inefficiency scores are initially increasing and then tend to decrease over time. Zschille 
and Walter (2011) analyzed the performance of public and private water utilities in Germany 
and applied both Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and SFA. In order to account for structural 
differences in water supply, they considered explanatory variables such as output density, water 
losses, ratio of groundwater input, elevation differences, per-capita debt of municipalities, and 
dummy variables for location in East Germany, governance mode and joint provision of water 
and sewerage services. Efficiency levels under SFA are considerably higher than those 
predicted by DEA, which can be explained by methodological differences between these 
approaches.
6
 In general, they conclude for the absence of economies of scope between water 
and sewerage. Moreover, a higher share of water losses, higher output density, higher elevation 
differences and location in East have a positive and statistically significant impact on costs. On 
the other hand, the per-capita debt of a municipality and private ownership are not statistically 
significant. Bottasso and Conti (2003) analyzed the evolution of operating cost inefficiency for 
the English and Welsh water industry over the 1995-2001 period by estimating an 
heteroskedastic stochastic variable cost frontier. They found that industry operating cost 
inefficiency has decreased over the sample period and that inefficiency differentials among 
firms have steadily narrowed. The authors suggest that their findings rest on efficiency 
enhancing effects brought about by incentives provided in the context of the 1989’s sector 
                                                          
6 DEA is a non-parametric approach based on linear programming techniques. Comparing to SFA, DEA is very sensitive to 
outliers and does not allow for statistical inference.  
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privatization and subsequent changes in the regulatory model in order to introduce yardstick 
competition. Coelli and Walding (2005) provide the first published set of comprehensive 
performance measures for the Australian water supply industry. DEA is used to provide 
measures of technical and scale efficiency for each operator. Their results indicate that the 
average firm has a technical efficiency score of 90.4%. Another example is the study by 
Filippini, Hrovatin and Zoric (2007) for the Slovenian water distribution utilities. The levels of 
efficiency estimates as well as the corresponding rankings strongly depend on the econometric 
model specification, meaning some volatility in their conclusions. Nevertheless, the different 
models produce consistent findings regarding economies of density (output and customer) and 
economies of scale.  
The econometric contributions presented in this section should be compared with some 
prudence. Reliability of data, data comparability issues and different estimation techniques 
contribute to different conclusions, recommending that performance measures should be 
interpreted very carefully. 
4- Data and methodology. 
As initially stated, the purpose of this paper is to study the cost efficiency of multimunicipal 
systems operating at the bulk level in the Portuguese water sector. An unbalanced panel data is 
used including all operators over the 2004-2011 period, consisting of a total of 143 
observations. Not every operator is yearly observed between 2004 and 2011, explaining the 
panel unbalancedness.
7
 The dataset used in this paper covers 20 firms, including at most 8 
observations per operator and a minimum of 2. The following table characterizes the panel 
structure:    
 
                                                          
7 For the following firms data was collected after the panel first year: Águas do Centro Alentejo (2005), Águas do Mondego 
(2006) and SIMARSUL (2006). Águas do Noroeste arose in 2010 from the merger of 3 multimunicipal systems: Águas do Ave, 
Águas do Cávado and Águas do Minho e Lima. The merged operators were considered as a new firm entering in the panel.   
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Table 1 – Panel structure 
Number of annual observations Number of operators Observations 
8 13 104 
7 1 7 
6 5 30 
2 1 2 
Total number of observations 143 
 
The data was taken from the Annual Reports on Water and Waste Services in Portugal 
(RASARP), the regulator’s online private database (Portal ERSAR) and from the operators’ 
annual financial statements (Relatório e Contas). Based on the Portuguese fiscal year, each year 
of observation starts at January 1 and ends the following December 31.  
As suggested by standard microeconomic theory (Varian, 2010), in order to estimate a cost 
function we need information on input prices and output quantities. It is also possible to include 
other explanatory variables to account for the sector specific characteristics. These are often 
named “structural variables” or “output characteristic variables”. In our cost model 
specification, we consider that operators use 2 inputs (L: labor; K: capital), with the 
corresponding prices Lp and Kp . They can produce 2 outputs: water ( AAY ) and wastewater 
services ( WWY ). Billed water was used as AAY  and collected wastewater as WWY (both variables 
are expressed in thousands of m
3
). Since there is no specific information on input prices, proxies 
were used to overcome this problem. In this context, we followed the suggestions of Lin (2005), 
Fraquelli and Moiso (2005), and Filippini, Hrovatin and Zoric (2007). 
Regarding the price of labor ( Lp ), it was proxied by the ratio between labor costs and the 
number of full-time equivalent employees. As labor costs we considered wages paid to 
employees and payroll taxes. We want to note that the number of employees does not consider 
outsourced workers because, by definition, the expenses with outsourced labor appear as 
external supplies and not as wages paid. The price of capital ( Kp ) is proxied by the annual 
capital costs divided by the capital stock. Depending on data availability, several possibilities 
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can appear in the numerator and denominator. In our model, capital costs only consist of 
depreciation expenses, that is, the recognition in costs that asset’s value decrease during the 
period in which it is expected to be used. The capital stock is approximated by the annual 
treatment capacity. This variable is obtained multiplying by 12 the monthly maximum treatment 
capacity. Since it is expressed in m
3
 of water, in the case of multi-output operators we just added 
the water treatment capacity to the wastewater treatment capacity.  
The dependent variable, total costs (TC), is obtained by adding up four main components: labor 
costs, depreciation, costs of goods sold (e.g. water and wastewater treatment products) and 
external supplies (essentially, energy costs). On average, the cost structure of multimunicipal 
systems is characterized by 20% of labor costs, 40% of depreciation costs and the remaining 
40% corresponds to the cost of goods sold and external supplies. The small values of standard 
deviations associated to each weight suggest a very low variability of the cost structure among 
operators, which was expectable since they belong to the same shareholder (Águas de 
Portugal), implying harmonization of management choices.  
To the best of our knowledge, the issue of endogeneity is not acknowledged in the references 
mentioned in this paper. Nevertheless, we should recognize beforehand that the way input 
prices are proxied potentially leads to endogenous regressors. In order to overcome this problem 
we estimated our regressions using input prices lagged 1 period (
1tL
p and
1tK
p ), implying the 
loss of 20 observations.      
The Portuguese multimunicipal systems operating at the bulk level differ in terms of size 
(output produced), network length and treatment capacity, as well as in terms of environmental 
conditions, such as climate and topography. Since these differences directly affect costs, we 
should include specific variables to account for different operating environments. The 
introduction of individual dummies (d1, d2 and d3) accounts for technological differences among 
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the different types of operators included in the sample, since each type is allowed to have a 
different intercept or, when considering interactions with other explanatory variables, a different 
slope. Whenever we were interested in a specific variable for water supply operators, in order to 
perform an interaction, we defined the dummy 3113 ddd  . In a similar way, for wastewater 
management operators: 3223 ddd  . 
 
 
Table 2 – Number of observations per type of operator 
AA only (d1) WW only (d2) AA and WW (d3) Total 
Number 24 39 80 143 
% 16.8% 27.3% 55.9% 100% 
 
The network length corresponds to the kilometers of pipes and collection network. This is an 
important variable to distinguishing between economies of output density and economies of 
scale. We expect that more kilometers of network increase total costs of operators. As a proxy 
for population density we used the ratio between the number of houses covered by the system 
and the size of service area (in km
2
). We expect an ambiguous effect for this variable. On the 
one hand, it can be more costly to serve more dispersed consumers, because more network 
infrastructure is needed per connection. On the other hand, there is the possibility of congestion 
problems in more densely populated areas. In our cost model, we also recognize the role of 
water abstraction sources: surface water, groundwater or both sources. Under the assumption 
that surface water abstraction requires more treatment to purify the water, as stated in Bottasso 
and Conti (2003) and Zschille and Walter (2011), we defined the following dummies to 
evaluate the impact of water sources on total costs: 1dSurface  if the operator only uses 
surface water and 1erdGroundwat  for groundwater abstraction only. Since this is a time-
invariant regressor, we will assess its impact on costs under Pooled OLS estimation.  
It is also interesting to evaluate the role of water losses in explaining total costs. By water losses 
we considered losses related to pipe bursts and leaks in treatment stations and reservoirs. 
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Following the approach of Correia (2008) and Zschille and Walter (2011), we obtained the 
losses ratio as the ratio between water losses and total water input (m
3
 of water in the system). 
As pointed out by Coelli and Walding (2005), the type of soil can influence total costs by means 
of higher water losses. They argue that clay soils are more prone to pipe breakages, leading to 
higher maintenance costs. However, considering a longer time horizon, water losses do not only 
depend on exogenous circumstances. Indeed, water losses allow us to evaluate the status of 
infrastructures: older networks and lack of maintenance decisively contribute to higher water 
losses. Therefore, two effects should be considered: higher water losses today may increase total 
costs today via the reintroduction of water in the system; on the other hand, higher water losses 
today may also mean higher total costs in the following period via better network maintenance 
and replacement investments. However, in subsequent periods, a renewed water network will 
probably reduce the costs of reintroducing water in the system to compensate for losses.       
Considering the available literature, it is often missing a reference to additional influencing 
factors such as output quality, climatic conditions or geomorphological characteristics. This 
paper will try to assess the impact of those factors in operators’ total costs. Lin (2005) explores 
the introduction of output quality variables and their impact on operators’ performance. The 
underlying idea is that quality improvements raise costs. In order to study this aspect, we 
calculated the water quality indicator (WQI) used by ERSAR, which is the percentage of water 
analyses that met the parametric values. We then converted those values into an ordered scale: 
“10” for 970.0WQI ; “20” if 990.0970.0 WQI ; “30” if 995.0990.0 WQI ; “40” 
if 000.1995.0 WQI ; and “50” when 000.1WQI . In what concerns climatic influences, 
we want to study the impact of average rainfall on total costs. Annual climatic bulletins 
published by the Portuguese Sea and Atmosphere Institute (former Portuguese Meteorological 
Institute) were used to obtain the spatial distribution of average annual rainfall. Depending on 
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the operator’s type, we expect different signs for the impact of rainfall on total costs. On the one 
hand, lower levels of rainfall reduce the quantity of surface water, forcing the multimunicipal 
systems to import water from neighboring systems or, alternatively, to explore other sources of 
groundwater abstraction. On the other hand, in the case of wastewater management services, 
due to specific network configuration, rain is collected by drains and gullies before being 
removed by the operator via public sewer. Therefore, when drainage does not separate rain from 
wastewater, a higher level of rainfall can potentially increase treatment costs. Furthermore, 
geomorphological characteristics can also influence operators’ performance. A hilly 
topography, that is, considerable elevation differences within the service area of a given 
operator will probably require higher pumping costs. In order to assess this aspect, we combined 
a hypsometric map with a map showing the delimitation of each multimunicipal system and 
constructed the variable “average elevation” (expressed in meters). This variable was calculated 
as the average between the highest and the lowest point within the area covered by each system. 
A higher average elevation is thus expected to increase operators’ costs, regardless of their type. 
Finally, depending on the model specification, time fixed effects were also included in order to 
capture unobserved year effects and to see how total costs have behaved over time.  
The estimation of a cost function requires a functional form. In the existing literature, the most 
common functional forms are the Cobb-Douglas and the transcendental logarithmic (translog) 
specification. Despite its flexibility, the translog specification often violates the assumptions of 
monotonicity and concavity, which are desirable for a cost function.
8
 Moreover, since the 
interactive terms are usually highly correlated it potentiates multicollinearity problems (one 
variable can be linearly predicted from the others), thus influencing the model statistical 
significance. Furthermore, in small samples, too many degrees of freedom are consumed. In 
                                                          
8 A detailed discussion about the desirable properties of a cost function can be found in Kumbhakar, S. C., and C. A. K. 
Lovell. 2000. Stochastic Frontier Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University, pp. 18-42.  
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light of these reasons, we decided to adopt the Cobb-Douglas specification. In order to obtain 
linearity in the parameters, we took the natural logarithm of all continuous variables, such that 
the estimated coefficients can be read as elasticities.
9
 A general example of a log-linear form of 
the Cobb-Douglas model is presented below (where Z is a given structural variable and D a 
possible dummy variable): 
 
In this paper, a more complete version of the cost model presented above is estimated using 
Pooled OLS, Fixed Effects (FE) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). Given the specific 
characteristics of each estimation approach, the cost model may present different specifications. 
For example, if we are interested in the role of several time-invariant explanatory variables (e.g. 
water sources or geomorphological characteristics), the FE model should be disregarded. 
Therefore, we should use of Pooled OLS or Random Effects (RE). The FE (or “within”) 
estimator, which explores the variation in data over time, eliminates the fixed effects by mean-
differencing and provides consistent estimators for the FE model. We cannot estimate the 
coefficient on a time-invariant variable since all observations of the mean-difference of a time-
invariant variable are 0. RE is an alternative, but it does not control for unobserved 
heterogeneity which is constant over time. In this case, the estimators may be biased. Although 
it yields estimates of all coefficients even those of time-invariant regressors, RE considers 
unobserved individual heterogeneity as being distributed independently of the regressors. This is 
a stronger assumption comparing to FE but it is often unsupported by the data.
10
 If the 
appropriate model is FE, Pooled OLS and RE both yield inconsistent estimators.  
Nevertheless, none of those least squares-based regression techniques is particularly suitable for 
studying cost efficiency. Indeed, several factors influence the structure of the production process 
                                                          
9 When necessary, in order to allow for linearization, 0 values were replaced by 10-9. 
10 For a comprehensive discussion of linear panel models: Cameron, A. Colin and Pravin K. Trivedi. 2009. 
Microeconometrics – Methods and Applications, 8th edition, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 697-778.  
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which, in turn, can explain the differences in efficiency behavior among firms. Knowing that, 
almost always, firms are not successful optimizers, SFA – introduced by Aigner, Lovell and 
Schimidt (1977) – is an econometric technique that allows modeling this type of behavior. Since 
it produces efficiency scores, we can obtain information for benchmarking purposes, which 
might justify its increasing popularity in the literature. The main particularity of SFA is that the 
error term is divided in two components: itu  is a non-negative random variable representing the 
operator’s own inefficiency and itv  is a noise term, which can be positive or negative, reflecting 
the influences affecting the operator ( 0itv  if it operates in a favorable environment and 
0itv  if it faces a negative environment). In a panel data context, assuming that there are k 
inputs and m structural variables, the cost frontier can be specified as:
11
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11 The graphical example is based on Figure 9.1 (p. 244) from Coelli et al. 2005. An Introduction to Efficiency and Productivity 
Analysis, 2nd Edition, Springer, New York. Although Coelli et al. present the case of a production frontier, the cost frontier 
model is very similar and easy to derive: instead of production as dependent variable we have total costs, quantities of inputs (K 
and L) are substituted by input prices as regressors, and the inefficiency term is multiplied by -1.  
Deterministic 
frontier 
Noise Inefficiency 
Figure 1 – Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (graphically) 
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Total costs of inefficient firms  0itu  lie above the minimum established by the cost frontier, 
that is, *it
obs
it TCTC  . Obviously, efficient firms operate at the frontier  0itu . Therefore, by 
definition, we have: itit
obs
it uTCTC  * ; ititit vTCTC 
det* ; itititit
obs
it vuTCTC  
det . 
Figure 1 illustrates the typical case of 2 firms. On the one hand, firm 1 operates in an 
unfavorable environment 01 v , implying total costs at the frontier higher than the 
deterministic value  tdeTCTC 11* . On the other hand, firm 2 faces a favorable operating 
environment 02 v .
12
 Since 0222  uv , observed total cost for firm 2 is higher than 
the deterministic value  tdeobs TCTC 22  . Following the notation presented before, we can 
easily obtain the efficiency score for firm i at time t from the estimated cost frontier:
13
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 it
ititit
itit
obsit
u
uvXf
vXf
TC
TC
ES 


 exp
expexp
exp)(*
 
Given that itu  was assumed as being a non-negative random variable, itES  will be constrained 
between 0 and 1, providing a meaningful interpretation: the closer itES  is to 1, the closer the 
firm is to maximum efficiency. 
Stata (xtfrontier) offers two possibilities of stochastic frontier models for panel data: a time-
invariant model (TI) and a time-varying decay specification (TVD). Stata provides maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimates for the parameters of both models. The time-invariant model assumes 
that inefficiency is constant over time: iit uu  . Under this specification, the inefficiency term is 
a time-invariant random variable following a truncated-normal distribution, which is truncated 
at 0 with mean   and variance 2
u . By assumption, iu and itv are distributed independently of 
                                                          
12 In our example, an operator facing an unfavorable environment can be one located in a rural area, characterized by a lower 
network density and small business size, or one located in a region of hilly topography.   
13 The inefficiency score is simply given by the reciprocal. Some papers, e.g. Bottasso and Conti (2003) and Fraquelli and 
Moiso (2005), present an alternative formula (but with similar interpretation) for the efficiency score, which corresponds to the 
inverse of ESit. 
(6) 
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each other and of the regressors. Then  2;~ ui Niidu   and  2;0~ vit Niidv  . When the 
time span covered by the panel is short, assuming time-invariant inefficiency seems a realistic 
assumption. It can also be a reasonable assumption if we are studying non-competitive 
environments, which are characterized by lower rates of innovation. In the particular case of the 
water sector, one may suspect that technological change has lagged behind other network 
industries, such as gas, electricity or telecommunications. On the other hand, in the time-varying 
decay model, also known as “Battese-Coelli model”, itu is defined as a truncated-normal 
random variable multiplied by an exponential specification of the behavior of individual effects 
over time, that is,
 
   iiiitit uTtuu   exp . Following the notation of Battese and 
Coelli (1992),   denotes the decay parameter, characterizing the evolution of inefficiency over 
time, t is the corresponding time period and iT  is the last period observed in the i-th panel. 
Immediately, iTt   in the last period, implying that the last period for firm i represents its base 
level of inefficiency. Therefore, this facilitates the interpretation of the decay parameter, because 
if 0 it means that inefficiency decreases over time towards the base level. Alternatively, if 
0 the inefficiency of operators increases over time. Moreover, when 0 , the time-
varying decay model is simply reduced to the time-invariant model. Under this specification, iu
and itv  keep the same distributional assumptions as in the time-invariant model. Indeed, the 
hypothesis of time-varying inefficiency is suitable for long panels. Nevertheless, as pointed out 
by Lin (2005), time-varying efficiency models restrict the technical efficiency of all firms, 
forcing them to follow the same trend direction. In other words, all operators must increase their 
levels of technical efficiency, or all must decrease them over time.  
In the next section, the estimation results from the three complementary approaches (Pooled 
OLS, FE and SFA) will be presented and discussed.  
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5- Empirical results: discussion.  
As mentioned before, depending on the estimation approach, the cost model may present 
slightly different specifications. In the next table, we present the estimation results for the 
“preferred” specification for each econometric model: 
Table 3 – Estimation results for the “preferred” specification for each econometric model 
Dependent variable 
TCln  
Pooled OLS 
(robust) 
Fixed Effects 
(robust) 
SF time-invariant 
inefficiency 
SF time-varying 
inefficiency 
AAYd ln1   
0.4420*** 
(0.0551) 
0.4256*** 
(0.0861) 
0.4030*** 
(0.0395) 
0.4047*** 
(0.0434) 
AAYd ln3   
0.1281** 
(0.0507) 
0.2735*** 
(0.0819) 
0.2224*** 
(0.0458) 
0.2191*** 
(0.0465) 
WWYd ln2   
0.4155*** 
(0.0377) 
0.6232** 
(0.2441) 
0.3867*** 
(0.0381) 
0.3910*** 
(0.0454) 
WWYd ln3   
0.3961*** 
(0.0891) 
0.1785*** 
(0.0565) 
0.2220*** 
(0.0525) 
0.2298*** 
(0.0577) 
1
ln
tL
P  0.2199* 
(0.1104) 
-0.0842 
(0.1055) 
0.0061 
(0.0943) 
0.0092 
(0.0975) 
1ln tKP  
-0.1044** 
(0.0446) 
-0.0063 
(0.0345) 
-0.0031 
(0.0325) 
-0.0009 
(0.0331) 
Networkln  0.3130*** 
(0.0507) 
0.2602*** 
(0.0795) 
0.2712*** 
(0.0412) 
0.2695*** 
(0.0480) 
Densityln  0.2324*** 
(0.0207) 
0.1969*** 
(0.0583) 
0.1930*** 
(0.0438) 
0.1850*** 
(0.0482) 
fallRainln  -0.0682 
(0.0410) 
0.0384 
(0.0226) 
0.0063 
(0.0310) 
0.0052 
(0.0311) 
Lossesd ln13   
0.0376 
(0.0241) 
0.0030 
(0.0233) 
0.0098 
(0.0241) 
0.0119 
(0.0246) 
WQId ln13   
-0.0278 
(0.0920) 
0.0412 
(0.0633) 
0.0175 
(0.0492) 
0.0126 
(0.0480) 
Time trend - - 
0.0099 
(0.0070) 
0.0118 
(0.0163) 
Constant 
1.7675*** 
(0.4526) 
2.3102** 
(0.8410) 
2.5666*** 
(0.5067) 
2.6513*** 
(0.5374) 
Nr. of observations 123 123 123 123 
2R  0.9651 0.3316 - - 
u  - 1.0217 - - 
e  - 0.0961 - - 
  - 0.9912 - - 
 Xβ;iucorr  - -0.8012 - - 
μ - - 0.3715 
(0.2269) 
0.2878 
(0.3014) 
η - - - 0.0057 
(0.0486) 
2ln  - - 
-3.2812*** 
(0.3852) 
-3.2099*** 
(0.6035) 
   1/ln  - - 1.2113** 
(0.5413) 
1.2934 
(0.7963) 
2  - - 0.0376 0.0404 
  - - 0.7705 0.7847 
2
u  - - 0.0290 0.0317 
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Firstly, Pooled OLS was used to evaluate the impact of average elevation and water sources in 
total costs. Regardless of the operator’s type (AA only, WW only or AA and WW), a hilly 
topography is expected to increase total costs via higher pumping costs. In what concerns the 
dummies for water sources, we would expect a negative sign for groundwater abstraction only 
and a positive sign if only surface water is used. Although not reported in Table 3, these 
variables were shown to be statistically insignificant when included in the regression. Regarding 
hilly topography, the effect is perhaps negligible: while in theory it could have an impact, in 
practice it is not an important determinant of costs. As far as we know, in the only paper where 
this factor is accounted for (Zschille and Walter, 2011), the authors found a positive and 
statistically significant impact. On the other hand, the impact of water sources could have been 
studied using an alternative variable if better data were available. For example, it would be 
preferable to have the shares of each type of water input, since the majority of operators uses 
water from both sources. When we introduce year dummies, although the estimated coefficients 
are positive, they are not statistically significant as well. Moreover, rainfall, water losses and 
water quality also do not explain well total costs. 
In the Pooled OLS estimation, the coefficients on outputs and price of labor are significant and 
consistent with economic theory: higher levels of output and a higher price of labor will raise 
total costs. Despite of being statistically significant, the coefficient on the price of capital is 
unexpected. In general, Pooled OLS is not the most efficient way to explore jointly the within 
(time dimension) and between (individual dimension) variability of data. If the appropriate 
model is FE, it will yield biased and inconsistent estimators.   
2
v  - - 0.0086 0.0087 
 The output reports the estimates for the coefficients and several parameters. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level and appear between brackets. 
 Code: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
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Secondly, we estimated our cost model by FE. For every specification, the Hausman Test was 
performed and allowed us to conclude that FE is always preferred to RE. As well as in the 
Pooled OLS estimation, panel-robust standard errors were used in order to adjust for 
heteroskedasticity. Although the clustered robust standard errors are slightly larger, the 
estimated coefficients remain practically unchanged. Regarding output quantities, we reach the 
same conclusions as in Pooled OLS, but input prices are now statistically insignificant, raising 
the possibility that price differences are not important in explaining total costs. Under FE 
estimation, we can conclude that average annual rainfall, water quality, water losses and year 
dummies apparently do not have a role in explaining total costs. Additional information can be 
extracted from the FE regression output. The standard deviation of residuals within operators
 0217.1u  is approximately 11 times higher than the standard deviation of overall 
residuals 0961.0e . The fraction of variance due to residuals within operators,
  %99222  euu  , tells us that practically all variance is due to considerable 
differences from one operator to another in terms of data variation. Finally, the empirical 
correlation between the errors within operators and the set of regressors,  Xβ;iucorr , is about 
-0.8012 (under RE this correlation is 0 by assumption). Nevertheless, least squares-based 
regression techniques, such as Pooled OLS, FE or RE, estimate cost functions assuming that 
deviations from cost-minimizing behavior are attributed exclusively to random statistical noise. 
Those approaches do not consider that each firm potentially expends more than it should due to 
an inherent degree of inefficiency. Therefore, it is useful to estimate our cost model under a last 
approach – Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). 
Under SFA, estimated frontiers envelop instead of intersecting the data. Given the possibilities 
offered by the econometric software (Stata 12.0), we provided estimators for two different 
specifications of the inefficiency term: time-invariant ( iit uu  ) and time-varying inefficiency 
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(“Battese-Coelli model”). Considering the two specifications, there are no significant 
differences between the estimated coefficients. As already expected, a higher level of output 
will result in higher costs. As in FE, input prices are not statistically significant. We note that 
under every approach (Pooled OLS, FE and SFA), the coefficients on network length and 
density (proxy for population density) always have a positive and statistically significant impact 
on total costs. Regarding network length, it just confirms our prediction: more kilometers of 
network mean higher costs. On the other hand, the positive sign on density points out that it is 
not more costly to serve more dispersed consumers, thus contradicting our initial belief. Under 
SFA, rainfall, water losses and water quality are not statistically significant.  
The SFA outputs also provide us some parameters of interest. The estimate on 2 , the total 
variance disturbance  222 vu   , can be used as a measure of the goodness of fit – the 
best model specification is the one with lower overall disturbance. The very high estimates of  
 , which is defined as  222 vuu   , suggests that the exogenous shocks affecting all 
operators (v component) are not very much relevant in explaining the distance of each operator 
to the cost frontier. Indeed, the main source of that distance lies on a very high degree of 
inefficiency (u component). When comparing the two specifications of SFA, the decay 
parameter ( ) of the time-varying inefficiency model allows us to decide which one is more 
appropriate. As mentioned before, when 0 , the time-varying decay model is simply reduced 
to the time-invariant model. Since the estimate on   is close to 0 and not statistically significant, 
our preference should go to the time-invariant specification for itu . We could have reached the 
same conclusion when noting that the estimates of the time-varying specification are not too far 
from those of the time-invariant model. The coefficients on the time-trend suggest that time 
does not seem to have a significant influence in the costs of multimunicipal systems operating at 
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the bulk level in the Portuguese water sector. Since the coefficients are not statistically 
significant, we can conclude for the absence of technological change during the period under 
analysis (2004-2011). Although the time-invariant hypothesis is somewhat restrictive because, 
hopefully, managers learn from past experience, we found evidence that operators kept their 
levels of inefficiency constant over time. As explained before, this is a reasonable hypothesis in 
the context of non-competitive environments, such as the water sector.  
Under SFA, we can obtain operators’ efficiency scores, which can be used for benchmarking 
purposes. Using the expression derived in Section 4, the average efficiency scores per type of 
operator are presented in the next table:   
Table 4 – Average efficiency scores per type of operator 
Selected model AA only WW only AA and WW Overall 
SF time-invariant inefficiency 80.3% 73.9% 71.1% 73.1% 
SF time-varying inefficiency 80.1% 76.9% 71.3% 74.0% 
 
The efficiency scores were obtained from the SF regressions presented in Table 3. Due to the 
different specifications for the inefficiency term, the individual efficiency scores will be constant 
over time under the time-invariant model. This comes from the assumption that operator i is as 
inefficient in 1t as in .;;3;2 Tt  On the other hand, in the time-varying model, each 
operator will have an efficiency score for every year of activity. In the next table, we present the 
ranking of multimunicipal systems by average efficiency scores: 
Table 5 – Efficiency ranking by average efficiency scores 
Multimunicipal system 
SF time-invariant 
inefficiency 
SF time-varying 
inefficiency 
Ef. Score Rank # Ef. Score Rank # 
Águas do Algarve 56.8% 20 55.9% 20 
Águas do Centro 87.3% 2 91.9% 2 
Águas do Centro Alentejo 76.9% 7 79.8% 6 
Águas do Douro e Paiva 76.2% 9 75.6% 9 
Águas do Mondego 84.6% 4 87.7% 4 
Águas de Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro 59.4% 19 59.5% 18 
Águas do Norte Alentejano 68.7% 13 70.3% 11 
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Águas do Oeste 67.1% 14 67.9% 14 
Águas do Zêzere e Côa 72.5% 11 74.7% 10 
SANEST 63.1% 17 64.0% 16 
SIMARSUL 76.4% 8 78.8% 8 
SIMLIS 85.7% 3 91.7% 3 
SIMRIA 79.9% 5 84.6% 5 
SIMTEJO 64.3% 16 65.4% 15 
Águas do Ave 59.7% 18 57.1% 19 
Águas do Cávado 94.8% 1 95.8% 1 
Águas do Minho e Lima 78.2% 6 79.2% 7 
Águas do Noroeste 75.2% 10 63.6% 17 
EPAL – “bulk” 69.8% 12 69.0% 12 
Águas de Santo André – “bulk” 66.2% 15 67.9% 13 
 
Although average efficiency scores present some differences when the two models are 
compared, we do not observe significant variations in the corresponding rankings. With the 
exception of Águas do Noroeste (10
th
 vs. 17
th
), there is stability in the ordering process of 
multimunicipal systems regarding their performance under the period covered by this paper. 
This is also true even when we consider more restrictive versions of the models presented 
before. When making an international comparison, average efficiency scores are not very far 
from those presented in other studies: 72% for Italy (Fraquelli and Moiso, 2005), 80.9% for 
Slovenia (Filippini, Hrovatin and Zoric, 2007), 83.53% for Germany (Zschille and Walter, 
2011), 90.4% for Australia (Coelli and Walding, 2005), and from 86 to 95% in the English and 
Welsh water sector (Bottasso and Conti, 2003). However, we want to note that the use of 
different approaches as well as different forms of industrial organization require some prudence 
when making direct comparisons using these levels of average efficiency. A final aspect that is 
worth to be mentioned is the higher average efficiency scores of single product operators (AA 
only and WW only). Contrarily to the traditional argument of scope economies, there is some 
evidence for gains from specialization. A possible explanation for this finding can be the 
existence of “cross-subsidization” between the two activities within the same operator. Indeed, 
being more efficient in one activity can be a reason to be less efficient in the other.   
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6- Conclusion. 
This paper aimed at studying the cost efficiency of multimunicipal systems operating at the bulk 
level in the Portuguese water sector. Under every approach (Pooled OLS, FE and SFA), higher 
output quantities are expected to raise total costs. It can also be concluded that input prices –
usually included to capture regional price differences – do not seem to have a significant 
influence in total costs. This conclusion is in line with the findings of Correia (2008) and 
corroborates the hypothesis of Martins, Fortunato and Coelho (2005), when they state that 
regional differences in prices are small in a small country like Portugal. Additionally, average 
rainfall, water losses and water quality apparently do not play a role in explaining operators’ 
total costs. Contrarily to our initial belief, the sign of the coefficient on density suggests that it is 
not more costly to serve more dispersed consumers. Regarding water sources and average 
elevation, they have shown to be irrelevant when Pooled OLS was performed. Since the time-
decay parameter is close to 0 and statistically insignificant, the time-invariant inefficiency model 
seems to be the most appropriate. We also found that inefficiency of operators remained 
constant over time, which is not an encouraging conclusion. The main source of the distance to 
the cost frontier is a high degree of inefficiency and not exogenous random shocks. However, 
average efficiency scores are not very far from those presented in other studies for developed 
countries. Since single product operators present higher average efficiency scores, there is also 
some evidence for gains from specialization.  
As a final note, we consider crucial that the regulator reinforces its engagement in continuing 
data collection, while ensuring its reliability. There is plenty of scope for further work. Once 
better data is obtained, this empirical exercise should be repeated. Moreover, as more years are 
added to the panel, we may also reconsider our choice regarding the functional form for the cost 
specification. 
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